Despite the large body of literature on the emergence and success of new political parties in Western Europe, few, if any, attention has been paid to investigate new parties from a systemic perspective, therefore exploring their potential effects on party systems. This article focuses on Party System Innovation (PSInn), defined as the aggregate level of 'newness' recorded in a party system at a given election. After having reviewed the extant literature on the topic, the article discusses what a new party is and provides a new index to measure PSInn. The article analyses the evolution of PSInn across 324 elections held in 19 West European countries from 1945 to 2015 and its cumulative effects over time. Although in most countries the party landscape today is still very similar to the one appearing after WWII, data offers clear evidence of a sharp increase of innovation in the last few years.
Introduction
In the past two decades, the instability of West European party systems has significantly increased, as witnessed by growing levels of electoral volatility (Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2015) . West European party systems have been changing not only because of the vote shifts among existing parties but also because of the growing support for new parties, such as the Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos and Ciudadanos in Spain, Alternative for Germany or Golden Dawn in Greece. The emergence of new parties, especially those with a large electoral strength, has the potential to make the interparty competition increasingly unstable and unpredictable (Casal Bértoa, 2014) . This outcome, in turn, if occurring consistently over time, can lead to party system de-institutionalization (Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2015) , a situation which -as we have learned from the Eastern European (Birch, 2003; Powell and Tucker, 2014; Sikk, 2005) and Latin American (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995) experience -may affect the democratic process, both in terms of its legitimacy and its effectiveness. Indeed, recent studies have pointed out that new party entry causes the reduction in voter turnout levels (Robbins and Hunter, 2011) and increases uncertainty both in the voting decision-making (Ezrow, Homola and Tavits, 2014; Marinova, 2016) and in the process of government formation (Grotz and Weber, 2015) , thus weakening accountability. In the context of Western Europe, new parties have been studied so far mainly from the traditional party-level perspective, by focusing on their ideologies, political platforms, organisations (Hug, 2001; Kitschelt, 1988; 1995; Lucardie, 2000; Willey, 1998 ). Yet, we still do not know much about the extent to which they have been successful over time and have been contributing to the reshaping of West European party systems. In other words, we need to address the issue of new parties from the less traditional systemic-level perspective 1 , especially by considering how relevant it has potentially become for the increasing instability of party systems in this area. This is what we aim to do in this article, which analyses Party System Innovation, defined here as the aggregate level of 'newness' recorded in a party system at a given election 2 . Our contribution is therefore primarily empirical and consists of a comprehensive picture of party system innovation across 19
West European countries and for the period going from the end of World War II (WWII) to 2015, thus taking into consideration the whole universe of parliamentary elections in the lower house.
More specifically, our first research question deals with the assessment of the evolution of party system innovation. Given the long-term emphasis put by scholars on the process of de-freezing of political alignments taking place since the 1970s (Dalton et al., 1984;  F o r P e e r R e v i e w 4 contributed to bring fresh opportunities for new parties to emerge (Hernández and Kriesi, 2015) .
Closely related to the first one, the second research question we address in the article concerns the assessment of how the different waves of innovation recurring over the last 70 years have reshaped the party system with respect to the one of the early post-WWII years. In other words, we want to understand whether and to what extent the current party systems resemble those established just after 1945. Based on the above-mentioned literature, we expect that, in Western Europe, the party landscape has progressively become quite different than that emerged after WWII and, again, that this process of differentiation has been particularly noticeable in the recent past.
The article is organised as follows. The next section synthetically reviews the different conceptualizations of 'new' political party, discusses our choice and, consequently, introduces our measures of party system innovation. In the following three sections, we analyse data on party system innovation in Western Europe since 1945. We first analyse the systemic impact of new parties in the single election; then we focus on the cumulative effects of innovation by analysing how much today's West European party systems are different with respect to those emerged 70 years ago; finally, we propose a typology of party systems related to the specific pattern they have followed as regards party system innovation. A concluding section follows. 
Measurement
As already seen in the introductory section, party system innovation is here defined simply as the aggregate level of 'newness' of parties in a given election, measured as the total share of votes obtained by all new political parties. Defining a 'new' political party, however, is not as simple as that. Thus, we need to address the preliminary question of what is to be meant by 'new'. There is a considerable body of literature on this topic and various scholars have given different answers to the question. However, considering that we are interested in new parties to the extent to which they influence the party system as a whole, here we will take into account only those definitions that: 1) clearly identify a set of indicators to be used to empirically detect whether a party is new or not, thus allowing for both crosscountry and cross-time comparisons, and 2) associate the newness of a party, to 'structural changes in parties that are consequential on electoral competition' (Marinova 2015: 269) 3 .
On the contrary, in order to establish a threshold between the 'old' and the 'new', we do not take into account the shift in the party ideological or programmatic dimensions since all parties experience frequent changes, though often to a very limited extent, in their ideological positions and platforms, but this does not make them necessarily new even to their habitual voters 4 .
According to the above-mentioned criteria, one of the first definitions found in the candidates at a general election to the system's representative assembly ' (2001, 14) , but in this case his definition, while including genuinely new parties and splits, excludes all kinds of electoral alliances and parties resulting from mergers. The same definition of party newness is adopted by Tavits (2006) and Zons (2015) .
Based on an even more restrictive approach, Barnea and Rahat defines as new 'a party that has a new label and that no more than half of its top candidates (top of candidate list or safe districts) originate from a single former party ' (2011: 311) . Similarly, for Bartolini and Mair (1990) as well as for Sikk (2005) the change of the party name or the formation of parties as result of mergers and splits do not make these parties as truly new units.
According to Bartolini and Mair (1990, 311-312) a party is considered as new only when it does not derive from the structure of an existing party (as in the case of mergers and splits), or, in other words, when it is a startup organisation. Sikk goes even further by adding the discontinuity in the political personnel and leadership as a necessary condition for political parties to be qualified as 'genuinely new'. According to this approach, also shared by Marinova (2015) , new parties are only those parties 'that are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important
figures from past democratic politics among their major members ' (2005: 399) . Table 1 visualizes and summarizes the various indicators stemming from the different operationalisations of the concept of 'new' party we have discussed so far. As we can see , 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   8 party newness has been regarded as the result of a wide array of phenomena, ranging from the simple denominational revision to the birth of a completely new political subject with no ties to existing parties and a new political staff. elections. The underlying assumption is that the party system innovation we are interested in is that occurring after the initial institutionalization of the party system 7 .
PSInn is calculated at time t with respect to time t-1 (namely, PSInn is calculated with respect to the status quo established at the previous election) and therefore each observation in each country is completely independent from the previous ones. In other words, according to PSInn, a party is considered 'new' only in the first election when it enters the party system by receiving at least 1% of the national share. Then, in the subsequent elections, it becomes 'old'. Yet, after the entry of that party, the resulting party system is different, to a certain extent, with respect to the original one, and this change will last as long as that party will be part of the system. Therefore, PSInn cannot tell us how innovation cumulates within a party system over time. To detect it we need a second, cumulative measure of party system innovation, based on the distinction between founder and non-founder parties in a party system. A party is considered as a founder if it has received at least 1% of the national vote share in at least one of the first two post-WWII elections (or, in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain, the first two democratic elections).
Otherwise, the party is counted as a non-founder. The rationale behind this choice follows the logic of the previous measure of PSInn: we look at the first two post-WWII or postauthoritarian elections and make a dichotomous distinction between relevant parties that formed the system (those who received more than 1% of the votes) and parties that emerged later or were only marginal actors (those below 1%) at that time. Figure 1 shows that, overall, party system innovation has been the exception rather than the rule across the Western Europe's post-WWII history. Elections clearly tend to cluster around low levels of the index, as confirmed by the positive skewness of the distribution. higher than 20). In a nutshell, empirical evidence seems to reveal that the 'fundamental bias towards stability' detected about 25 years ago by Bartolini and Mair (1990: 68) appears confirmed in the aggregate for the 1946-2015 period as regards PSInn 9 . Yet, by adopting a longitudinal perspective in order to verify our expectation about the increase of PSInn over time, we note that, interestingly, these elections with high innovation are not randomly distributed across time, but occur more frequently in the last decades, with a specific concentration in the last few years. Table 2 disaggregates the sample across decades and lists the elections having a level of PSInn higher than five. Data show a clear trend towards increasing party system innovation over time. The overall correlation between PSInn and time, albeit far from deterministic, is positive and significant (r = 0.213; p < 0.001).
Moreover, the increase in the levels of PSInn remains limited across the decades (from 0.82 during the 1950s to 2.16 during the 1990s, with a small reversal in the 2000s), up to the last few years, when it jumps to the unprecedented mean level of 5.36. This means that, since 2010, on average, the aggregate party system innovation in a given election has been higher than 5%. In other words, on average, a new party receiving 5% of the national share has been created at each election since 2010 (or, alternatively, five new parties receiving 1% each) 10 . In absolute terms this level of innovation can certainly be considered not impressive, but if compared with the previous decades the difference is indeed impressive: in the 2010s, the average PSInn is almost three times that of the previous decade and that of the whole period , while it is about six times and a half the average of the 1950s.
The number of elections with no innovation at all has consistently declined through time, from about 79% in the 1950s to 39% in the 2010s. Conversely, the share of elections with a considerable level of innovation (PSInn higher than five) has markedly increased, moving from 5% during the 1960s to almost 23% in the 2010s. Furthermore, as Table 2 (Hernández and Kriesi, 2015) , showing a significant relationship between poor economic performance and party system de-institutionalization in the last years (Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2016) .
The longitudinal analysis reveals that, Western Europe, moving from a long period of impressive electoral stability with always the same party alternatives contesting elections time after time, has experienced increasing levels of innovation during the last decades, with a particular emphasis in the last few years, where elections characterised by the emergence of new parties have increased, both in terms of raw numbers and in terms of aggregate levels of innovation. Yet, we still need to clarify whether this trend is common to all countries or whether different trajectories can be detected by looking at the national variations of PSInn. Table 2 provided some insights on this point, revealing the presence of countries with multiple innovative elections (i.e., with PSInn higher than five), such as 
Figure 2 about here
We note that the above-detected overall pattern of increasing innovation is mainly due to the overwhelming wave of innovation occurred in the last years in a few countries, such as Greece, Iceland, Italy and Spain, four countries severely hit by the economic crisis and where the party system has been massively reshaped by the entry of new powerful political parties. In Greece, the dramatic election of May 2012, characterised by the highest level of electoral volatility in West European post-WWII history (Emanuele 2015) has led to the To compare current party systems with those emerged after WWII, Figure 3 
The Effects of Innovation on Party Systems after 70 years: A Typology
Beyond the static comparison between current party systems and those emerged after WWII, the analysis of temporal variations can reveal the specific trajectories followed by each country as regards the rise and success of non-founder parties and the resilience of founder parties. 2) Absorbent party system, where PSInn is higher than the average but CPSInn in the last election is still lower than the average: in this context, there have been relevant changes in the party system but they have been mainly reabsorbed;
3) Overlaid party system, where PSInn is lower than the average but CPSInn in the last election is higher than the average: this means that there have been only small changes in the system, but these latter have layered, enduring over time; 4) Transformed party system, where both variables are higher than the average: deep changes have occurred and the resulting transformations have endured through time, being clearly visible still today. Norway and Sweden, 'grand coalition' as in Austria and Germany, up to the oversized government in Switzerland). This is to say that there is not a 'magic formula' to grant party system stability and avoid the emergence of new parties, but this outcome can result from very different political contexts.
On the opposite side of the scatterplot Spain, France and, above all, Italy fall close to the right end of the regression line: in these contexts, there has been a massive PSInn with a consolidation of these changes over time. As a result, the political landscape in these countries is very different and has been transformed with respect to the one that structured 
Conclusion
In this article we have focused on party system innovation, defined as the aggregate level of 'newness' recorded in the party system at a given election, with specific reference to Western Europe after 1945. In doing so, we have provided some original contributions in terms of both the conceptual framework and, above all, the empirical analysis.
First, unlike the most recent research focusing on a party-level approach, we have adopted a systemic-level perspective to achieve a comprehensive assessment of how the emergence and success of new parties has affected the party system as a whole.
Consistently, we have not simply analysed new parties per se, but we have measured the amount of innovation, that is, the overall vote share received by new parties, both in absolute terms (PSInn) and in cumulative terms (CPSInn). This has allowed us to weigh This evidence suggests that, as regards party system innovation, the picture of Western Europe is far from uniform, being instead quite diversified. While in some countries the party landscape is still the same as it used to be 70 years ago and, therefore, relevant new parties have never appeared, in some other countries various and sometimes intense waves of innovation have taken place. Of course, the birth and success of new parties per se is not a problem for the functioning and the quality of the democratic process. It can even be beneficial to democracy insofar as it reflects the emergence of a new cleavage or new issues -as it was the case in the 1980s with the green parties -or the need for a major change in the political class -for instance in Italy during the first half of the 1990s. Yet, as we have learned from the experience of countries in other areas of the world, it can become a problem for democracy when the success of new parties occurs consistently and repeatedly over time, leaving no room for the institutionalisation of the party system. So far, and for the past 25 years, this situation has been confined to Eastern Europe and Latin America.
Yet, following what we have detected in our analysis, it is likely that even some West European countries will not continue to remain immune from the risk of a prolonged phase of party system de-institutionalization. The systemic-level approach is not entirely original, since it was adopted by Mair (1993) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995) , although their analyses date back to the first half of the 1990s and focus not exactly on the strength of new parties but rather on the resilience of old parties.
2 Note that our concept of 'party system innovation' roughly corresponds to that of 'party replacement' developed by Birch (2003) . Both refer to the overall electoral strength of new parties in a given election. Nevertheless, we have preferred to use a different term because -as it will be clear in the article -our conception and operationalization of what a new party is greatly differ from those of Birch. Moreover, unlike in Mair (1997), our conception of party system innovation does not refer to the governmental arena but to the electoral arena. 4 This requirement leads us to discard definitions where parties are seen as new only in that they represent new political issues (Willey, 1998), new or 'purified' ideologies (Lucardie, 2000) , or transform themselves, by revising their programme and/or appealing to new groups of voters (Krouwel and Lucardie, 2008) , if these changes do not have a structural nature.
5 Among the latter we find, though not exclusively, both the Left-libertarian parties (Kitschelt, 1988) emerging from the post-materialist revolution of the 1970s, and the Radical Right parties that are a reaction of the opposite sign to same process (Kitschelt, 1995) .
6 See Emanuele (2015) for further methodological insights on these criteria. The empirical observation carried out by Morlino in Southern Europe (1998) confirms that party systems tend to stabilize over a period of three elections after the (re-)establishment of the democratic regime. 8 For further details on the two measures and the data sources see the Appendix.
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Moreover, by considering parties' vote share in the calculation of PSInn, we rely on the electoral arena. This latter is the only arena where the interactions between parties and voters can be taken into account. The electoral results of new parties are the only measurable tools to gauge voters' reactions to parties' structural changes and, therefore, are crucial to assess whether the innovation has a sizeable impact or not. The electoral arena works as a 'thermometer' of the extent to which voters are available to exert the extreme form of electoral change, that is, voting parties that have never contested elections. The 'size' (in terms of vote share) of this availability (captured by PSInn) also becomes an implicit estimate of the retrospective negative evaluation of the existing alternatives and of the propensity to shift to political forces devoid of a valuable -and therefore criticisablepast.
We have also set a threshold at 1% at a given election in order to exclude marginal parties. Note that the threshold of 1% is set to identify the 'borders' of a given party system. A similar choice is consistent with other authors (Marinova, 2015; Powell and Tucker, 2014) , although they rely on more exclusive thresholds. Any threshold could be considered arbitrary and has its own trade-offs. However, not to set any threshold would be even more distorting for calculating the extent to which a party system is undergoing an innovation. Indeed, given that we are interested in parties that are somewhat relevant for the system, a threshold is necessary to set a qualitative distinction between parties that produce a significant change within the system and parties that simply enter the election 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 A complete list of all new parties entering in the calculation of PSInn can be found below in Table A1 .
CPSInn is the sum of the vote share received by non-founder parties in each election.
A party is considered as a founder if it has received at least 1% of the national vote share in at least one of the first two post-WWII elections (or, in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain, the first two democratic elections). Otherwise, the party is counted as a non-founder.
Nevertheless, problems of classification may arise as far as time goes by and founder parties undergo organizational transformations (party relabeling, joint lists, splits, mergers).
In order to detect under what conditions a party can be considered as a founder or as a non-founder -consistently with PSInn and following again Bartolini and Mair's choices about party splits and mergers (1990: 311-312) -we have used the following rules: 1) when a founder party changes its name, it remains a founder party; 2) when two founder parties merge, the resulting party is still consider a founder one; 3) when two parties split from a founder, both are considered as founders; 4) when a founder party and a non-founder party merge, the resulting party is a founder if the former was the larger one, otherwise it is a non-founder.
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